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EMPLOYERS WHO IMPLEMENT PRE-EMPLOYMENT TESTS TO
SCREEN THEIR APPLICANTS, BEWARE (OR NOT?): AN ANALYSIS
OF LANNING v SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY AND THE BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE AS APPLIED
IN THIRD CIRCUIT EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that in order to merely qualify for an interview for a position
as a firefighter, each applicant-within four minutes and while wearing a
twenty-pound vest-has to carry a fifty-pound hose up six flights of stairs
and then drag the equivalent of a 175-pound person one hundred feet.'
Suppose further that this test results in only a small percentage of women
passing, compared to a large percentage of men. As a result, female appli-
cants who had failed the test sue the fire department for discrimination
and quickly meet their prima facie burden by showing that the test has a
disparate impact on women. In response, the department argues that de-
spite its discriminatory impact, the test is necessary to screen out unquali-
fied applicants who may pose a threat to public safety if they are hired as
firefighters. Can the defendant prevail with such a justification?
This Casebrief attempts to answer the aforementioned question and,
in doing so, it explores the difficult issues that arise when courts formulate
standards to determine whether an employer's justification for ajob-selec-
tion test with a disparate impact satisfies Title VII of the 1991 Civil Rights
1. See Barbera v. Metro-Dade County Fire Dept., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1334
(S.D. Fla. 2000) (providing basis for above hypothetical). Barbera has similarities
to, but is fundamentally different from, the above hypothetical. For instance, Bar-
bera involved, inter alia, a fire department that employed a physical ability test
(PAT) as one of four job-selection methods to screen applicants and select its em-
ployees. See id. (stating facts). The PAT first required applicants to complete five
tasks in eight minutes: while wearing a twenty-two-pound weight vest, the applicant
had to (1) carry a fifty-pound hose up six flights of stairs; (2) pull a forty-eight-
pound weight inside a fourth story window; (3) hammer a resistant beam with a
nine-pound mallet; (4) pull a one-hundred-pound section of hose; and (5) drag
the equivalent of a 175-pound person one hundred feet. See id. at 1334 n.3
(describing test). The department, however, modified the test twice in order to fix
certain problems with the test's administration. See id. at 1334-35 (noting em-
ployer's procedure for creating its test). Subsequently, a group of white males
sued the department claiming that its hiring practices were favorable to females
and, thus, had a disparate impact on males. See id. at 1336 (providing case's his-
tory). The plaintiffs argued that the department illegally modified its testing pro-
cedures, resulting in more females passing the PAT and being included in the
applicant pool. See id. (stating plaintiffs' arguments). Ultimately, the court held
that the plaintiffs failed to show that the test or its modifications had a disparate
impact on men. See id. at 1336-38, 1340-41 (explaining court's holding). It further
held that the department adequately showed that the test accurately measured an
applicant's physical aptitude to serve as a firefighter. See id. at 1338-39, 1341 (pro-
viding court's decision).
(1403)
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Act ("the Act" or "the 1991 Act").2 The pervasive issue in such cases typi-
cally is "What burden does the law impose on employers when proving a
business necessity for their employment practices in a disparate impact
case?"3 Thus, if the standard is too strict for employers to meet, they may
impermissibly use quotas in hiring to avoid litigation; 4 if it is too lenient,
employers will be able to adopt a multitude of facially neutral policies that
have discriminatory effects on a protected class and easily defend them
with business necessity.
5
This Casebrief further focuses specifically on the development of the
law in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit surround-
ing employment discrimination cases under the disparate impact theory of
discrimination and the "business necessity defense," particularly in cases
where employers utilize a pre-employment test to screen job applicants.6
Part II explains the origins and substance of the disparate impact theory,
which gives rise to the defense. 7 Part III examines in detail the history of
the business necessity defense and its present state among the federal cir-
cuits.8 Part IV analyzes the Third Circuit's approach to the business neces-
sity defense by reviewing its most recent decisions in Lanning v.
2. For a further discussion of the different standards used by the federal cir-
cuits for measuring whether an employer's justification for using a pre-employ-
ment test to screen applicants complies with the 1991 Civil Rights Act, see infra
notes 43-69 and accompanying text.
3. See Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims Under the New Title VII, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1153, 1154 (1993) (explaining key question in disparate impact
cases). For a further discussion of the standards employed by the federal circuit
courts for measuring an employer's business necessity defense and whether the
standard is relatively strict or lenient, see infra notes 43-69 and accompanying text.
4. See Carvin, supra note 3, at 1154 (explaining consequences if employer's
burden of proving business necessity is too harsh); see also Kingsley R. Browne, The
Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill," a Codification of Griggs, a Partial Return to
Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 287, 381-82 (1993) (dis-
cussing Congress's anti-quota sentiment). Browne notes that during the legislative
debates and drafting of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress seriously considered
arguments against codifying a strict business necessity standard because polls
showed that the majority of American citizens not only opposed rigid quotas, but
also the "whole notion of racial and sexual preferences." Id. at 381. Browne ar-
gues that the Act is responsive to such sentiments and that courts should interpret
it accordingly. See id. at 381-82 (giving author's thesis).
5. See Carvin, supra note 3, at 1154 (projecting consequences if employer's
burden of proving business necessity is weak). Carvin explains that the standard
must consider both interests in order for employment practices to be fair to both
employers and protected classes. See id. (stating author's opinion).
6. For a further discussion of the disparate impact theory, see infra notes 13-
17 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the business necessity de-
fense, see infra notes 24-42 and accompanying text.
7. For a further discussion of the history of the disparate impact theory and
the rationale for shifting the burdens of proof between the litigating parties, see
infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion of the business necessity defense and the different
standards for measuring it within the federal circuit courts, see infra notes 24-69
and accompanying text.
1404 [Vol. 48: p. 1403
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Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("Lanning /-)9 and Lan-
ning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("Lanning Ii") 1"
(collectively referred to as "Lannine') and provides relevant considera-
tions for those who use the defense in litigation. I Finally, Part V discusses
the overall impact of Lanning and its future implications for
practitioners.
1 2
II. TITLE VII's DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
A. The Disparate Impact Theory and Its Basis
The disparate impact theory of discrimination, which was judicially
created in the United States Supreme Court case of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.,' 3 applied under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act when a facially
neutral employment practice disproportionately affected a particular
group on the basis of the group's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.14 In Griggs, the Court acknowledged that even though Title VII
did not specifically provide for the disparate impact cause of action, it in-
tended to prohibit both overt discriminatory practices and practices that
are neutral in form, yet have a discriminatory effect on a protected
group.' 5 The Griggs Court cautioned, however, that Title VII "does not
9. 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999) (remanding case for district court to apply new
business necessity standard).
10. 308 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's findings after it
applied new minimum qualifications standard that SEPTA proved that its pre-em-
ployment test was business necessity).
11. For a further discussion of Lanning I and Lanning II and their impact on
litigants in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 70-127 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the potential consequences of Lanning I and
Lanning H for practitioners, see infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
13. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
14. See Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 2000) (ex-
plaining concept of disparate impact theory); Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 485 (discuss-
ing origins of disparate impact theory for Title VII employment discrimination
cases); see also Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Approach to Disparate Impact and
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 72 OR. L. REV. 253, 259-69 (1993) (arguing that Griggs
was necessary to eliminate serious barriers to equal employment opportunities);
ChristineJolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. RE-v. 642, 656-57
(2001) (noting how disparate impact cases often arise from employer's pre-em-
ployment tests to screen applicants).
15. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (discussing Congress's intent in enacting Title
VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act). The Court noted that Congress's objective was:
[T]o achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures,
or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot
be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status q'io of prior discrimi-
natory employment practices.
Id. at 429-30; see also 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964) (memorandum of Sens. Clarke
and Case) (stating that employers under Title VII do not have to abandon "bona
fide qualifications tests" if members of some groups outperformed members of
other groups); Ramadanah Salaam, Adams v. Florida Power Corp.: Federal Circuits
2003] 1405
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command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the
subject of discrimination," for the Act only seeks to remove "unnecessary"
employment barriers that operate to discriminate on the basis of unlawful
classifications.' 6 Subsequently, Congress codified the disparate impact
cause of action for Title VII under the 1991 Civil Rights Act.' 7
Disagree on the Validity of ADEA Claims Pursued Under the Disparate Impact Theory of
Liability, 26 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 225, 226 (2002) (acknowledging that before
Griggs, courts analyzed evidence supporting disparate impact theory under dispa-
rate treatment theory of liability). The disparate treatment theory of liability is
drastically different from the disparate impact theory. See id. at 226 (contrasting
two theories). The disparate treatment theory alleges that the employer has inten-
tionally discriminated against plaintiffs, whereas the disparate impact theory does
not require intentional discrimination. See id. (describing key differences between
theories); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Dispa-
rate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1479, 1481
(1996) (noting that despite strong evidence showing that Congress intended only
to hold employers liable for intentional discrimination, riggs authorized disparate
impact causes of action in Title VII). An example of a case that involves Title VII's
disparate impact theory of discrimination is Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d
795 (8th Cir. 1993). In that case, a Domino's pizza franchise policy stated that no
employee who delivered pizza could have facial hair, which was implemented in
response to perceived customer preferences about bearded employees. See id. at
796, 798-99 (stating facts). Many African-American men, however, have the skin
condition pseudofolliculitis barbae, which makes shaving either impossible or ex-
tremely difficult. See id. (noting plaintiffs' problem with following employer's pol-
icy). As a result, I)omino's did not employ many African-American men to fill its
delivery positions. Consequently, a group of African-American men sued Domino's
under the disparate impact theory. See id. (providing procedural posture of case).
The Eighth Circuit struck down the policy on the ground that it had a dispropor-
tionate impact on African-American men and that Domino's failed to justify the
rule by showing it was a business necessity, for perceived customer preferences did
not make the practice a business necessity. See id. at 798-99 (providing court's
holding).
16. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31 (explaining how Congress did not intend Title
VII "to guarantee a job to every person regardless of qualifications"). The Court
asserted that Congress only required the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and un-
necessary barriers" to employment that have a discriminatory effect. Id. at 431.
The Court further stated that the "touchstone [of disparate impact cases] is busi-
ness necessity," indicating that an employer with a neutral policy that has a dispa-
rate impact must justify it by showing that the policy is a business necessity,
otherwise the practice is prohibited. Id. But see Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of
Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1, 6 (1987)
(arguing that Grggs makes it permissible for employers to adopt race-based, affirm-
ative action programs). Thus, Blumrosen notes that "[o]nce disparate impact is
identified, voluntary action to ameliorate it is necessary to avoid liability in the
absence of business necessity." Id.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2003) (codifying disparate impact cause of ac-
tion). The statute reads in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ...
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.
Id. (emphasis added).
1406 [Vol. 48: p. 1403
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B. The Burdens of Proof in a Disparate Impact Case
Although Title VII seeks to eliminate discriminatory and arbitrary bar-
riers to equal employment opportunity, it attempts to do so while preserv-
ing legitimate employer discretion.' 8 These two competing interests are
reflected in the statute's burden-shifting approach for disparate impact
claims. 19 For example, once plaintiffs demonstrate that a selection proce-
dure has a disparate impact on their protected class, both the burden of
production and persuasion shift to the employer to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is "job related for the position in question and consis-
tent with business necessity." 20 If the employer, in response, demonstrates
18. See Spiropoulos, supra note 15, at 1528 (explaining how Congress in-
tended for limits to exist with respect to courts interfering with employers' prac-
tices). Spiropoulos states that "courts must interpret Title VII in a manner that will
both facilitate the removal of arbitrary barriers to equal employment opportunities
and protect legitimate employer prerogatives." Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at
29 (1963) (comments made by Rep. William M. McCulloch) (remarking that Title
VII still gives employers discretion in hiring). Representative McCulloch stated
that:
[Tjhe Commission must confine its activities to correcting abuse, not
promoting equality with mathematical certainty. In this regard, nothing
in [Title VII] permits a person to demand employment. Of greater im-
portance, the Commission will only jeopardize its continued existence if
it seeks to impose forced racial balance upon employers or labor unions.
Similarly, management prerogatives, and union freedoms, are to be left
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible. Internal affairs of employers
and labor organizations must not be interfered with except to the limited
extent that correction is required in discrimination practices.
Id.
19. See Spiropoulos, supra note 15, at 1528 (noting that § 2000e-2(h) of Title
VII protects right of employers to give professionally developed ability tests).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (2003) (stating burdens of proof under
Title VII disparate impact theory). The statute reads in pertinent part:
(1) (A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this title only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a partic-
ular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity ....
Id.; see also Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1985) (allowing
plaintiffs to meet prima facie case by showing through statistics that policy had
disparate impact on blacks); Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Dispa-
rate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 393-94 (1996) (discussing how
disparate impact cases begin with plaintiff establishing through statistical evidence
that employment practice has disparate impact on protected class). Grover notes
that in order to shift the burden to employers to prove the business necessity
prong, plaintiffs typically must prove "that the challenged practice 'select(s) appli-
cants for hire or promotion in a ... pattern significantly different from that of the
pool of applicants."' Id. at 394 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 425 (1975)); see also Memorandum from Michael E. Brooks, Office of the
General Counsel, to the Legal Instruction Unit of the FBI Academy 1 (2001) (on
file with author) (discussing applicable law for creating physical fitness tests).
Brooks discusses how a plaintiff proves that an employment practice has a dispa-
rate impact:
5
Sarno: Employers Who Implement Pre-Employment Tests to Screen Their Appl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
business necessity, the plaintiffs can still prevail if they can show that "an
alternative employment practice has a less disparate impact [on their
group] and would also serve the employer's legitimate business needs."21
The Supreme Court has ruled that the plaintiff must show that a facially
neutral standard results in a "significantly discriminatory pattern." The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is a federal agency
charged with promulgating federal regulations to implement Title VII
and other federal anti-discrimination legislation. These regulations do
not have the force of law . . . . However[,] courts will consider these
guidelines in ruling on Title VII issues. The EEOC has provided that a
selection procedure which results in a protected group's selection rate of
less than 80 percent of the group with the greatest success will be consid-
ered to have resulted in a disparate impact. While this is a significant
issue in most Title VII litigation, it usually does not become an issue in
challenges to physical fitness standards.
Id. at 7; see also Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning I), 181 F.3d
478, 487 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining how burden of persuasion in establishing pol-
icy's business necessity rests with employer). It should be noted that in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Alonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court held that the employer only
bears the burden of production and that the burden of persuasion remained on
the plaintiff at all times. See id. at 659 (stating burden of persuasion for parties in
disparate impact case at that time). Congress, however, explicitly overruled that
holding and placed the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove business
necessity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (providing new shift in employer's burden for
disparate impact cases).
21. Lanning 1, 181 F.3d at 485 (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975)) (discussing burdens of proof in disparate impact case); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (k) (1) (A) (ii) (stating burdens of proof in Title VII cases).
The statute reads, in pertinent part, that after the employer has demonstrated bus-
iness necessity, the plaintiffs may demonstrate "an alternative employment practice
and [that] the [defendant] refuse[d] to adopt [the] alternative employment prac-
tice." Id.; see also Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1473-74 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that plaintiff has not met his burden under alternative practice prong).
In Smith, the plaintiff sued under a disparate impact theory when the city fired him
as a firefighter because he could not pass the physical fitness test required in order
to wear a self-contained breathing apparatus that was essential for his job. See id. at
1468 (stating facts). Plaintiff claimed that the test had a disparate impact on him
due to his age. See id. at 1467 (describing plaintiffs argument). Once the plaintiff
established that the test had a disparate impact, the city defended by showing that
the test was job-related because often firefighters must wear the breathing appara-
tus when they go to the scene of a fire. See id. at 1471 (providing defendant's
argument). The city also showed that the standard was necessary for safe and ef-
fective job performance because it protected the health of the employee. See id.
(describing further defendant's rebuttal argument). In response, the plaintiff at-
tempted to show that a less discriminatory alternative means of assessing fitness for
older firefighters exists. See id. at 1473 (noting plaintiff's response). He suggested
that the city use spirometry and stress tests to determine which firefighters may be
unfit for the job and then require them to undergo multiple physical examinations
to determine fitness for the job. See id. (providing plaintiffs suggestion for alterna-
tive less discriminatory test). The court held that the plaintiff did not meet his
burden because he did not show that his proposed alternative would have a less
discriminatory impact on older firefighters than the city's present system. See id.
(stating court's holding). Hence, the plaintiff only showed that he could possibly
pass the alternative test, but he did not show the test's effects on other firefighters.
See id. (explaining court's reasoning).
1408 [Vol. 48: p. 1403
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Nevertheless, the statute gives employers a business necessity defense,
thereby protecting their business interests and allowing them possibly to
continue a legitimate policy even if it has a disparate impact on a pro-
tected group.22 As for the precise contours of the business necessity de-
fense, however, the Supreme Court has yet to interpret the 1991 Act's
language of 'job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity," which has led the federal appellate courts to interpret
it in varying ways, yielding different standards for employers to meet in
various jurisdictions. 23
III. THE BUSINESS NECEssrrY DEFENSE
The lower federal courts have had difficulty in consistently defining
the 1991 Civil Rights Act's requirements for a successful business necessity
defense. 24 The Act specifically instructs that in interpreting its business
necessity language, "[n]o statements other than [a two-paragraph] inter-
pretative memorandum" shall be considered or "relied upon in any way"
as legislative history. 25 In essence, the interpretative memorandum states
that "the terms 'business necessity' and 'job related' are intended to re-
flect the concepts enunciated... in [Griggs] and in other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio."2 6 Therefore, in order
to understand the current conflict between the federal circuits over the
correct standard for analyzing the business necessity defense, it is neces-
22. See Spiropoulos, supra note 15, at 1528 (concluding that Title VII protects
employer's legitimate prerogatives).
23. See Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 488 (explaining how Supreme Court has yet to
interpret standard adopted by 1991 Civil Rights Act); David E. Hollar, Physical Abil-
ity Tests and Title VII, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 785-93 (2000) (stating conflicting
standards of business necessity defense between federal circuit courts).
24. See Hollar, supra note 23, at 785-93 (noting how lower federal courts have
interpreted Act's mandates differently, which has led to different approaches in
assessing employer's business necessity defense).
25. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071,
1075 (1992); see also Lanning 1, 181 F.3d at 488 (restating substance of interpreta-
tive memorandum). In its entirety, § 105(b) provides that:
[N]o statements other than the interpretative memorandum appearing
at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall
be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative
history in construing or applying, any provision of the Act that relates to
Wards Cove Business necessity/culmination/alternative business practice.
Id.; see also Grover, supra note 20, at 392-93 (explaining that legislative memoran-
dum is only legislative history available for courts to use to interpret Act, per Con-
gress's directions). Grover notes that because the Court's decisions prior to Wards
Cove were somewhat ambiguous, multiple interpretations of the business necessity
standard among the lower courts have arisen. See id. (stating problem for lower
courts as result of Court's ambiguous holdings).
26. 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see also 137 CONG. REc. 28,680 (1991) (providing
interpretative memorandum to 1991 Civil Rights Act); Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 488
(discussing role of interpretative memorandum).
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sary to briefly mention the evolution of the defense from Griggs leading up
to the passage of the Act.
27
A. The History of the Business Necessity Defense
1. Providing a Framework for the Defense: From Griggs to Wards Cove
After the Supreme Court first adopted the disparate impact theory in
Griggs, the Court endeavored to define "business necessity" in light of the
plaintiffs and employer's competing interests.2 8 For instance, the Griggs
Court ultimately held that the employer's use of an intelligence test and
educational requirements to screen applicants for a coal handler position
violated Title VII because the defendant did not prove that the require-
ments measured job performance. 29 In doing so, the Court noted that the
"touchstone" of a disparate impact case with a pre-employment test is "bus-
iness necessity," yet it was imprecise and used different language through-
out its opinion when stating the correct standard for a successful business
necessity defense: Griggs concurrently held that a challenged employment
practice must be "related to job performance;" have a "manifest relation-
ship to the employment in question;" bear "a demonstrable relationship to
27. For a further discussion of the conflicting standards among the federal
circuits in measuring the business necessity defense, see infra notes 43-69 and ac-
companying text.
28. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (holding that
when facially neutral employment test has disparate impact on protected class, it
could violate Title VII even if no evidence exists to show that employer had dis-
criminatory intent); Earl M. Maltz, Title VII and Upper Level Employment-A Response
to Professor Bartholet, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 776, 778-79 (1983) (discussing how Court
has been inconsistent since Griggs in its disparate impact jurisprudence).
29. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (concluding that employer has not justified
employment practice with sufficient proof of practice's necessity to its business).
Griggs involved a claim against the defendant, Duke Power Company, who re-
quired that applicants for work in its coal handling department have a high school
diploma or satisfactory scores on both a standardized general intelligence test and
an aptitude test. See id. at 427-28 (providing employer's policy). Such require-
ments excluded a disproportionate number of black workers as compared to
whites. See id. at 430 (stating policy's impact). For instance, the high school di-
ploma requirement would have excluded eighty-eight percent of the state's black
residents, compared to sixty-six percent of its white residents, and the aptitude
tests would have excluded ninety-four percent of the blacks, compared to forty-two
percent of the whites. See id. at 430 n.6 (discussing policy's consequences). A
unanimous Supreme Court held that such practices violated Title VII unless justi-
fied by the employer. See id. at 430 (providing Court's holding). To justify such a
policy, the Court required the defendant to show that the discriminatory employ-
ment practice was a business necessity and job-related, which the employer was
unable to do. See id. at 436 (explaining Court's holding); see also Hollar, supra note
23, at 779 (discussing facts and holding of Griggs). Hollar notes that before Griggs,
it had been unclear whether courts under Title VII would treat a facially neutral
employment practice that tended to disproportionately exclude women or minori-
ties as unlawful. See id. at 778 (noting problems before Griggs decision). The Su-
preme Court, however, "answered that question" in Griggs by holding that such a
practice indeed violates Title VII. Id.
1410 [Vol. 48: p. 1403
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successful performance of the jobs for which it was used;" and bear some
"relationship to job-performance ability."3 0
The Court continued its indecisiveness in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody,3 1 where it once again used different language to describe the em-
ployer's burden by stating that discriminatory employment tests must be
"significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior
which . . . are relevant to the . . . jobs for which candidates are being
evaluated."32 On the other hand, although the language in Griggs and
Albemarle varied, both cases created a heavy burden for defendants to suc-
cessfully assert business necessity, and they consistently focused on
whether the pre-employment test was job related and whether it measured
job performance.3 3 Likewise, in Dothard v. Rawlinson,34 the Court subse-
quently announced the standard for a successful business necessity de-
fense, again using different language to articulate it, but also
encompassing its prior themes: "a discriminatory employment practice
must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a
Title VII (disparate impact] challenge." 35
30. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 436; see also Lanning , 181 F.3d at 485 (stating
how standard enunciated by Supreme Court in Griggs for business necessity de-
fense was unclear and listing different language used by Court to attempt to enun-
ciate standard); Linda Lye, Title VII's Tangled Tale: The Erosion and Confusion of
Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 315,
321 (1998) (listing different language used by Court to define business necessity in
disparate impact cases under Title VII and discussing how it has led lower courts to
create different standards in order to analyze business justifications set forth by
employers).
31. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
32. Id. at 431 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (2003)). In Albemarle, an em-
ployer sought to use verbal exam and high school diploma requirements for mak-
ing its hiring and promotion decisions, whereby white workers disproportionately
outperformed racial minorities. See id. at 408-11 (stating facts). To meet its bur-
den under the business necessity defense, the employer hired an industrial psy-
chologist to complete validation studies showing that the tests were job related. See
id. at 429-30 (discussing employer's actions). The employer showed that its tests
had a significant statistical correlation with manager ratings in several groups of
the jobs in question. See id. (providing employer's evidence to prove that its re-
quirements were necessary). The Court rejected the studies, holding that the em-
ployer failed to show that its requirements were job-related. See id. at 434-36
(giving Court's holding); see also Hollar, supra note 23, at 779-80 (discussing how
standard in Albemarle was strict and would "likely render most physical and written
tests invalid"); Lye, supra note 30, at 324 (stating how Court "considerably strength-
ened the disparate impact plaintiff s hand" by adopting strict standard for business
necessity defense).
33. See Lye, supra note 30, at 326 (concluding that Court had imposed "exact-
ing demands" on defendant attempting to justify test as job-related).
34. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
35. Id. at 331 n.14 (emphasis added). Dothard involved women who chal-
lenged the Alabama prison system's statutory height requirement of being at least
five feet, two inches and a weight requirement of being at least 120 pounds for its
prison guard positions. See id. at 323-24 (stating facts of case). Such requirements
would exclude approximately thirty-three percent of all women between eighteen
and seventy-nine years of age, but only one percent of all men between the same
9
Sarno: Employers Who Implement Pre-Employment Tests to Screen Their Appl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Shortly after the composition of the Court changed in the late 1980s,
however, it began to drift from its prior precedent by allowing employers
more discretion in their employment practices.3 6 In 1989, such endeavors
culminated in Wards Cove, where the Court explicitly held for the first time
that the employer bears only the burden of production, not persuasion, at
the business necessity stage of disparate impact litigation.3 7 Furthermore,
it held that an employer only needs to show that its challenged practice
"serves, in a significant way," its "legitimate employment goals," which is
ages. See id. at 329 (discussing impact of employer's requirements). The State
justified its pre-employment requirements because it believed that prison guards
need to be strong. See id. (stating State's reason for its requirements). It, there-
fore, reasoned that taller, heavier people tended to be stronger. See id. at 331
(explaining State's justification). The State, nevertheless, failed to introduce any
statistical evidence to prove its assertions. See id. (showing how State failed to prop-
erly prove its justification). Thus, the Court held that the State did not meet its
burden under the business necessity defense. See id. (providing Court's holding).
It concluded that if "strength" were actually a genuine "job-related quality," the
State could easily validate a test that measured strength directly instead of through
reliance on height and weight measurements. See id. at 332 (explaining Court's
reasoning); see also Hollar, supra note 23, at 780 (discussing Court's holding and
reasoning in Dothard); Lye, supra note 30, at 326-27 (explaining how Dothard clari-
fied business necessity standard, but still left some unresolved issues).
36. See N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-87 (1979) (making
more lenient standard for employer). In Beazer, plaintiffs challenged the Transit
Authority's blanket exclusion of any individual using or possessing methadone
from all employment positions, which disproportionately implicated Hispanic and
black people. See id. at 571 (stating facts). While the Court found that the plain-
tiffs failed on their prima facie case to prove disparate impact because their statis-
tics did not encompass the relevant labor market, it commented in dicta on the
business necessity defense. See id. at 584-85 (giving Court's comments in Beazer).
The Court stated, in a footnote, that even if the plaintiffs had proved a disparate
impact, the defendant would have shown business necessity by establishing that its
practice significantly served its legitimate business goals of safety and efficiency.
See id. at 587 n.31 (providing Court's dicta). Subsequently, in Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988), the plurality similarly noted that employ-
ers could justify a pre-employment test by simply advancing a legitimate business
reason for the practice in question. See Hollar, supra note 23, at 781 (discussing
how Court upheld employment requirement in Beazer). Hollar interestingly noted
that the Court did not assess whether the employer's rule was necessary for safe job
performance, which was the standard articulated in Dothard. See id. (stating how
Court possibly deviated from its holding in Dothard) ; see also LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS
G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES,
AND JUSTICE 836 (3d ed. 1998) (noting how Republican President Ronald Reagan
appointed Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy in 1986 and 1988, respec-
tively, to Supreme Court to fill vacancies left by retiring Justices Lewis F. Powell
and William J. Brennan); Lye, supra note 30, at 327-29, 331-32 (noting that Court
took "a definitive step towards disparate impact's current state of erosion and con-
fusion" through its opinions in Beazerand Watson); Linda M. Mealey, Note, English-
Only Rules and "Innocent" Employers: Clarifying National Origin Discrimination and Dis-
parate Impact Theory Under Title VII, 74 MINN. L. REV. 387, 405 (1989) (arguing how
Court's decision in Beazer weakened Griggs standard).
37. SeeWards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (changing
burden for employer in Title VII disparate impact case from burden of persuasion
to only burden of production to justify its employment practice).
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substantially more deferential and pro-employer than the previous stan-
dards.38 Consequently, though, the Court's dramatic shift in its Title VII
jurisprudence did not go unnoticed. 39
2. Congressional Disapproval and the Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991
Even though the Court finally settled on precise language for the bus-
iness necessity defense in Wards Cove and seemed to resolve the defense's
previous issues, Congress grew increasingly concerned over the Court di-
minishing Title VII protections through its holdings. 40 Therefore, after
exhaustive debates within Congress and with the Bush administration,
Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which effectively reversed the
Court's decision in Wards Cove by once again placing a burden of persua-
sion-rather than merely a burden of production-on the defendant to
38. Id. The Court concluded that the "dispositive issue is whether a chal-
lenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the
employer." Id. The Court explained that lower courts, therefore, should engage
in a "reasoned review" of the employer's justification for instituting the challenged
practice. Id. Moreover, the Court emphasized that "there is no requirement that
the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business
for it to pass muster." Id.; see also Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lan-
ning I), 181 F.3d 478, 487 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing how Court adopted more
liberal test for business necessity in Wards Cove); Robert Belton, Causation and Bur-
den-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on
Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1359, 1405 (1990) (arguing that deci-
sions of conservative Court in late 1980s on its Title VII jurisprudence are as out-
moded as its decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); Reginald Alleyne,
Smoking Guns Are Hard to Find, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 1989, at 5 (noting how Su-
preme Court's "underlying dislike" for Title VII is reflected in its Wards Cove deci-
sion); Linda Greenhouse, The Year the Court Turned to the Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
1989, at Al (reporting that Wards Cove effectively overruled Griggs standard).
39. See Lanningl, 181 F.3d at 487 (noting that in response to Court's decision
in Wards Cove, Congress enacted Civil Rights Act of 1991).
40. See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 106
HARv. L. REv. 896, 906-07 (1993) (hereinafter The Civil Rights Act) (discussing Con-
gress's response to Court's decisions that substantially limited plaintiffs' ability to
prevail in Title VII lawsuits); see also 136 CONG. REC. H6/95 (1990) (statement of
Rep. Owens) (commenting on Court's decision in Wards Cove). Representative
Owens remarked that:
Years of steady progress lurched to a halt .... Here again in America,
racism has been made socially acceptable .... And now thanks to Ronald
Reagan's appointments to the Supreme Court, here again in America,
racism in the workplace has been made legally tenable . . . . Years of
consensus and consistent precedent were swept aside .... [W]hat the
Court has said to employers in Wards Cove is that while you still can't
commit blatant, obvious acts of discrimination against minorities and wo-
men, if you are sophisticated and discreet about it, we will look the other
way. You cannot hang a "no blacks allowed" sign on your door, but if
you're clever and come up with a standardized test or some other superfi-
cially neutral ruse that achieves exactly the same result, no one will stand
in your way. You can be a bigot, in other words, so long as you are a kind
and gentle one.
Id. (citations omitted).
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prove business necessity and by codifying the business necessity defense to
require that the challenged practice "be job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity."4' Furthermore, the Act
permits courts to look only at a single memorandum as legislative history,
which states that the terms "business necessity" and "job related" "are in-
tended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in
[Griggs], and in [the Court's] decisions prior to [Wards Cove]." 4 2
B. How Other Circuits Have Evaluated the Defense
Because the cases from Griggs to Wards Cove do not expound a readily
articulable standard for business necessity, the lower courts have been una-
ble to adopt a uniform standard to analyze the legitimacy of an employer's
justification for a practice that has a disparate impact, leading mainly to
three different standards employed outside the Third Circuit.4 3
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2003); see also The Civil Rights Act, supra
note 40, at 896-906 (explaining political struggle to enact 1991 Civil Rights Act);
James Forman, Jr., Victoy by Surrender: The Voting Rights Amendments of 1982 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 10 YALE L. & POL'v REV. 133, 174 (1992) (stating that in
order for 1991 Act to pass, proponents had to withdraw from notion of greatly
expanding employees' civil rights). The Democrats in Congress primarily sought
to overturn the Court's decision in Wards Cove and to codify the Griggs standard.
See id. at 899-900 (stating one political party's view). Conversely, the Republicans,
along with the Bush Administration, were concerned with drafting a bill that would
make it too difficult for employers to prevail in disparate impact suits and, as a
result, to use quotas in their hiring processes to avoid discrimination suits. See id.
at 900 (noting Republican party's concerns). Hence, as a result of the controversy:
[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1991 endured a two-year odyssey that involved
twenty-two days of hearings, introduction of at least ten major alternative
bills, dozens of versions of these bills, a veto, a failed veto override, scores
of hours of debate on the floors of the House and the Senate, and hun-
dreds of hours of meetings.
Id. at 900-01 (citations omitted). In the end, however, it was a compromised piece
of legislation that spoke vaguely and handed the problem back to the courts. See
id. at 902-03 (explaining how Act is product of compromise between two parties).
At least minimally, though, it effectively overruled the holdings in Wards Cove, in-
cluding its business necessity definition. See id. at 910 (discussing Act's impact).
But see Carvin, supra note 3, at 1164 (arguing that Wards Cove remains good law
even after 1991 Civil Rights Act); see also Grover, supra note 20, at 387 (stating how
business necessity defense "secured a statutory foundation" in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act). Grover also correctly notes that because the Court's decisions prior to Wards
Cove are inconsistent, definitions for the terms 'job-related" and "consistent with
business necessity" have been difficult to ascertain. See id. at 393 (describing lower
court's difficulties in interpreting Act).
42. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071,
1075 (1992) (emphasis added); see Hollar, supra note 23, at 783 (noting how all
legislative history for Act is foreclosed from being used by courts except single
memorandum).
43. See Hollar, supra note 23, at 785 (stating how Court's precedent is confus-
ing with respect to terms "business necessity" and 'Job-related," resulting in lower
courts struggling to create unified standard); Douglas W. Kmiec, The 1991 Civil
Rights Act: A Constitutional, Statutory, and Philosophical Enigma, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 911, 917 (1993) (noting how Congress has left "business necessity" defense
undefined, which has thereby produced "unnecessary make-work for lawyers" and
1414
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First, the most lenient and widely used of the three tests is the "mani-
fest relationship" test, which stems from the broad language used in
Griggs.4 4 Circuit courts using the test mandate that the employer prove
merely "a manifest relationship" between its pre-employment demands
and successful job performance to satisfy the Act's business necessity re-
quirements. 45 Hence, if the employer demonstrates a legitimate business
purpose and shows that the implemented test will further that purpose,
the test will survive the challenge. 4 6 Next, other circuits have interpreted
the Act's language to require the employer to prove that the challenged
practice is "demonstrably necessary" to meet "an important business goal
for Title VII purposes," which, when compared to the "manifest relation-
ship" standard, requires a higher correlation between the employer's re-
quirements and its goal of screening unqualified applicants.
47
increased burdensome litigation for employers and employees); Mack A. Player, Is
Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 1, 18 (1989) (discussing how Court gave conflicting signals as to mean-
ing of "business necessity" in Griggs). Player observes that "[i]n the seventeen years
between Griggs and the Court's decision in [ Wards Cove], the Court failed to define
with any precision what it meant by 'business necessity."' Id. at 2.
44. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (stating that em-
ployers are required to show that pre-employment test has a "manifest relationship
to the employment in question"); see also Hollar, supra note 23, at 785-86 (discuss-
ing how courts use manifest relationship test to analyze defense and how it is most
lenient compared to other standards that courts have used); Lye, supra note 30, at
352-53 (listing manifest relationship test as one of tests that lower courts have used
to interpret Act's language for business necessity).
45. See Hollar, supra note 23, at 785-86 (noting that courts use manifest rela-
tionship test, which is most lenient of lower courts' tests). Hollar contends that
while the test is supported by broad language in Supreme Court precedent, it ap-
pears inconsistent with the Court's disposition of cases in the 1970s, when it an-
nounced very strict standards.
See id. at 787 (discussing potential inconsistency with Court's precedent and
manifest relationship test); Lye, supra note 30, at 352-53 (listing standard as one
used by lower courts to satisfy Act's language in analyzing whether test is 'job-
related" and "consistent with business necessity"); see also Ass'n of Mexican-Ameri-
can Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2000) (using manifest rela-
tionship test to evaluate employer's business necessity defense in disparate impact
claim); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 n.10 (10th Cir.
1999) (using manifest relationship test when no safety concerns implicated);
NAACP v. Town of East Haven, 70 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 1995) (mandating mani-
fest relationship between employment practice and test); Zamlen v. City of Cleve-
land, 906 F.2d 209, 217 (6th Cir. 1990) (following standard that uses manifest
relationship test in cases where nature of employment does not involve safety con-
cerns); Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 211 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying manifest
relationship standard); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.
1971) (adopting manifest relationship standard); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803
F. Supp. 259, 321-22 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (interpreting 1991 Act to require employer
"to show that its selection criteria bear 'a manifest relationship to the employment
in question"').
46. See Hollar, supra note 23, at 786 (explaining how employer can prove busi-
ness necessity under manifest relationship test in disparate impact case).
47. See Bew v. City of Chicago, 252 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 2001) (outlining
standard for business necessity defense, using demonstrably necessary standard);
2003] 1415
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Finally, the remaining circuits-relying on language in Albemarle and
Dothard-have used the so-called "close-approximation-tojob-tasks" stan-
dard to analyze whether an employer's job-selection test is valid under the
Act.48 Under such a standard, if the physical test "closely approximates a
task that the applicant would actually perform on the job," courts are likely
to uphold it.49 For instance, courts are more likely to uphold a police
department's test that requires an applicant to scale a six-foot wall or run
one and one-half miles in twelve minutes under this approach than if the
test required doing a set of push-ups in a specified time because the for-
mer requirements are considered "critical duties" typically performed in
the course of employment, whereas the latter task is not.50 Courts that
adopt the close approximation standard reason that if a test encompasses
actual job tasks, it makes it highly consistent with business necessity and
less likely that the test masks intentional discrimination or screens out
qualified applicants. 5 1
C. The Third Circuit's Approach Toward Evaluating the Business
Necessity Defense
Given the aforementioned approaches toward analyzing the business
necessity defense under the Act, in 1999 the Third Circuit in Lanning 152
addressed the issue for the first time.53 The Third Circuit in LanningInot
only declined to follow other circuits' approaches, but it announced the
Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (employing demonstrably
necessary standard for disparate impact cases); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d
1112, 1118-19 (l1th Cir. 1993) (employing demonstrably necessary standard);
Banks v. City of Albany, 953 F. Supp. 28, 35 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (adopting demonstra-
bly necessary standard); Donnelly v. R.I. Bd. of Governors, 929 F. Supp. 583, 594
(D.R.I. 1996) (using synonymous standard); see also Lye, supra note 30, at 350-51
(discussing Fitzpatrick and demonstrably necessary standard).
48. See Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470-73 (8th Cir. 1996)
(using standard to uphold employer's test); see also Hollar, supra note 23, at 789-91
(calling test "close-approximation-to-job-tasks" and discussing its substance and
how courts analyze employers' pre-employment practices to see if they satisfy Act).
49. Hollar, supra note 23, at 789. Hollar notes that the close approximation
standard focuses mostly on the test's form, while the manifest relationship test
focuses mostly on the skill being tested. See id. (contrasting two tests).
50. See id. at 789-90 (illustrating application of close approximation test based
on past cases). Hollar explains how the close approximation standard is closely
tied to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's guidelines for validating
employment tests. See id. at 790 (discussing how standard follows agency's guide-
lines). More specifically, the Commission's concept of "content validity" is satisfied
"by data showing that the content of a selection procedure is representative of
important aspects of performance on the job." Id.
51. See id. (discussing rationale for test and arguments supporting its use).
52. Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning I), 181 F.3d 478 (3d
Cir. 1999).
53. See LanningI, 181 F.3d at 485 (stating that appeal focuses on proper stan-
dard for evaluating whether pre-employment test is 'job-related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity" under Act). The business neces-
sity issue was mainly the sole issue in Lanning I because the defendant conceded
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strictest standard for analyzing the business necessity defense to date: an
employer's job-selection test must "measure [only] the minimum qualifica-
tions necessary for the successful performance of the job in question. 54
Consequently, under the Third Circuit's standard, several issues can
arise when litigating whether an employer has met its burden under the
business necessity defense. 55 For example, an employer must first show
that the test's requirements correlate to successful job performance. 56
That is, the skills that the pre-employment test measures must be skills that
employees actually use to execute their jobs, rather than skills that the
employer merely perceives to be important for the job.57 Thus, if an em-
ployer implements, for instance, a physical fitness exam, it cannot simply
claim that the job is physically demanding and expect a court to uphold
the exam, without more, if it has a disparate impact on a protected class. 58
Rather, the employer will have to show-usually by statistical evidence-
that without the skill, the employee would compromise the effectiveness of
the job in question.59
Similarly, another issue that litigants will have to address is whether
the test effectively measures only the mere minimal qualifications or de-
gree of the skill necessary for successful job performance. 6 " Employers,
for example, must prove that at least those minimally qualified will be able
to pass their test.6 1 They will also need to show that by merely passing the
that its pre-employment test had a disparate impact on women. See id. (stating
Lanning Is narrow issue).
54. Id. at 490.
55. See id. at 491-94 (discussing reasons why SEPTA had not met its burden
under newly announced standard, reflecting what defendants must show to prevail
under standard).
56. See id. at 492 n.21 (discussing that one reason why court is skeptical of
defendant's statistical studies is because "the absolute number of arrests ... do[es]
not necessarily correlate with successful job performance").
57. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning II), 308 F.3d 286,
290 (3d Cir. 2002) (questioning whether defendant's study "overemphasizes" use
of skill measured in actually performing job functions).
58. See Brooks, supra note 20, 6-7 (explaining employer's burden under busi-
ness necessity defense). With respect to their job selection tests, employers must at
least show "a significant relationship between the physical fitness requirement and
the responsibilities of members of their department" to have a legitimate chance
of proving business necessity in the Third Circuit. Id.
59. See Lanning II, 308 F.3d at 290 (highlighting lower court's assertion that
inability to pass defendant's pre-employment test would compromise job's overall
effectiveness).
60. See id. at 291 (noting that critical issue in case is what minimum qualifica-
tions were actually necessary to successfully perform job's functions); see also
Joanna Grossman, What Defines "Business Necessity" in the Discrimination Context?: A
Federal Appellate Case Grapples with How Fast Transit Police Oficers Must Run, Nov. 19,
2002, at http://wit.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20021119.html (reporting that
Third Circuit remanded case to trial court in Lanning I to determine if SEPTA's
standard measured only minimum qualifications).
61. See Lanning II, 308 F.3d at 292 ("[T]o set an unnecessarily high cut-off
score would contravene Griggs."). The Third Circuit noted that it would be illegal
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test, the applicants are much "more likely"-than those failing it-to be
able to satisfactorily execute the job's functions.6 2 To determine such,
courts will first closely scrutinize the test's cut-off score by looking at
whether the employer legitimately set the cut-off based on sufficient evi-
dence that that score measures only the minimum abilities for the job,
rather than the employer arbitrarily setting the score.6 3 For instance,
when establishing an effective cut-off score, an employer cannot rely solely
on its experts' subjective judgments, 6 4 nor can it simply reason that "the
higher the performance, the better the applicant will be at the job," and so
set the score unnecessarily high.65 On the contrary, an employer will have
to use a variety of experts, studies and statistics to establish a valid cut-off
to require applicants to have to score so high on the pre-employment test that
their predicted rate of success is one hundred percent. See id. (discussing tests
that would violate federal law).
62. Cf id. at 291-92 (holding that acceptable interpretation of "minimum
qualifications necessary" is "likely to be able to do the job" and that, in effect,
employers have right to demand chance of success that is better than twenty per-
cent). But see Grossman, supra note 60, at 4-6 (interpreting phrase "minimum
qualifications" more literally). Grossman appears to take a stricter view than the
Lanning II court on how to determine if the pre-employment test truly measures
the minimum. See id. (noting author's disapproval with Third Circuit's disposition
in Lanning I1). More specifically, her inquiry would be: "[C]ould someone with a
lesser [score than the cut-off] successfully perform the tasks required of [the job]?
If so, the fitness requirement would be invalid." Id. Apparently, Grossman takes
the view that if one person who does not meet the test's requirements could still
perform the job's tasks, the test is invalid. See id. (explaining author's assertion).
Under the Lanning II interpretation, however, an employer can still prevail even if
the plaintiff can prove that some applicants who fail could still perform the job's
tasks effectively. See Lanning I, 308 F.3d at 291 (articulating Third Circuit's rul-
ing). Hence, as long as the employer can show that "individuals who fail the test
will be much less likely to successfully execute critical policing tasks," it can prevail.
Id.
63. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning I), 181 F.3d 478,
492 n.19 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Where... the cut-off score chosen has a discriminatory
disparate impact, Griggs prohibits the establishment of ... arbitrary barrier[s] to
employment opportunities.").
64. See id. at 491-92 (holding employer's test invalid under Title VII because it
relied on its experts' judgment alone to set its cut-off score).
65. Id. at 493 n.23 (stating that "more is better" theory-where employer sets
high score because higher performers on test typically will perform better on job-
results in unnecessarily high cut-off scores and will not be valid basis to set scores
under Title VII). The Third Circuit notes that studies that actually prove "more is
better" are not always irrelevant. See id. (providing Third Circuit's analysis). The
court explains that for some positions where applicants' higher scores on a pre-
employment exam correspond to betterjob performance, a cut-off score based on
the "more is better" theory is justified. See id. (stating how some employers may
legitimately use tests where higher scores indicate better candidates). The court,
for example, notes that a typing exam for the position of a typist may be justified in
setting a high cut-off score, given that the faster, more accurate typists are usually
better on the job. See id. (stating court's example). Even so, however, the em-
ployer will still have to show evidence of such. See id. (discussing employer's bur-
den). Nevertheless, the Third Circuit acknowledges that the "more is better"
approach is accurate only in the "rarest of cases where the exam tests for qualities
that fairly represent the totality of a job's responsibilities." Id. Thus, it contends
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score and to prove that those who meet its score are, in a real sense, more
likely to be able to do the job effectively.66
The final significant hurdle-and one that litigants may often over-
look-is that when employers attempt to prove the aforementioned issues,
they must do so using validated, relevant studies and evidence. 67 The
plaintiffs and courts should and will undoubtedly scrutinize the defen-
dant's evidence for deficiencies and unreliability. 68 Employers, however,
can attempt to dispose of these arguments by showing that they used
sound principles of statistical analysis, such as a representative sample, and
that the studies' conclusions correlated closely to job performance, which
would be shown by a high correlation coefficient for each study.
69
IV. ANALYSIS OF LANNING I AND LANNING H
On October 15, 2002, the Third Circuit delivered its opinion in Lan-
ning 1.70 In doing so, the Third Circuit not only reaffirmed the "mini-
mum qualifications" standard set forth in Lanninglas the correct standard
to evaluate an employer's justification for a job-selection test that has a
disparate impact, but it also indicated how it expected the lower courts to
apply the standard.
7 1
A. Facts
To upgrade the quality and physical fitness level of its transit police
force, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA")
hired an expert exercise physiologist to develop an appropriate physical
that for complex jobs where "intelligence, judgment, and experience" play a criti-
cal role, hiring based on rank from a job-selection test would be erroneous. Id.
66. See generally id. at 491-93 (discussing that employer needs validated studies
rather than just its experts' subjective opinions to prove business necessity).
67. See id. at 493 n.21 (cautioning district court to "take a critical look" at
employer's studies on remand). The Third Circuit warned that the story that sta-
tistics "tell depends, not unlike beauty, upon the eye and ear of the beholder." Id.
Furthermore, it stated that courts "must apply a critical and cautious ear to one
dimensional statistical presentation." Id. (quoting Bryant v. Int'l Sch. Serv., Inc.,
675 F.2d 562, 573 (3d Cir. 1982)).
68. Cf id. at 493 n.21 (explaining how courts must critically look at em-
ployer's evidence of business justification).
69. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning I), 308 F.3d 286,
290-91 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing concerns over defendant's evidence to prove bus-
iness necessity).
70. 308 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002). For a further discussion of Lanning I, see
infra notes 84-122 and accompanying text.
71. See generally Lanning I, 308 F.3d at 289 (quoting Lanningl, 181 F.3d at 491
n.16) ("We are accordingly confident that application of the business necessity
standard to SEPTA is fully consistent with the Supreme Court's pre-Wards Cove
jurisprudence as required by the Act."). The Third Circuit reviewed and affirmed
the lower court's findings that SEPTA had met the requirements of the minimum
qualifications standard for a successful business necessity defense. See id. at 289-93
(stating Third Circuit's holding).
20031 CASEBRIEF 1419
17
Sarno: Employers Who Implement Pre-Employment Tests to Screen Their Appl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
Viii-ANoVA LAW REVIEW
fitness test for its police officers and applicants. 72 After conducting stud-
ies, SEPTA's expert recommended that SEPTA's goals could be met if of-
ficers had a 42.5 mL/kg/min aerobic capacity, which officers would have
if they could run one and one-half miles in twelve minutes. 73 Therefore,
SEPTA used its expert's recommendations as a basis for creating and insti-
tuting an applicant screening test.7 4 Thus, if applicants could not run one
and one-half miles in twelve minutes, SEPTA would disqualify them from
consideration for employment as transit officers.75 As a result of SEPTA
administering the test to its applicants, the pass rate for women was 6.7%,
compared to a 55.6% pass rate for men during the time period involved in
the litigation. 7
6
Because the test had a disparate impact on women, five female appli-
cants who failed the test brought a Title VII class action suit challenging
SEPTA's use of the screening test;7 7 in response, SEPTA conceded to the
test's discriminatory effect, yet it argued that the test was necessary to de-
termine if the applicant could successfully perform the job's duties. 78 The
district court, by using the "manifest relationship" test, entered judgment
for SEPTA on all claims because SEPTA proved business necessity: its
72. See Lanning 1, 181 F.3d at 481-82 (giving facts of case).
73. See id. at 482 (discussing SEPTA's basis for establishing its cut-off score to
its applicant screening test). Dr. Paul Davis, SEPTA's expert, initially decided that
an aerobic capacity of 50 mL/kg/min was essential to successfully perform the job.
See id. at 482 n.3 (explaining expert's method for creating SEPTA test). Interest-
ingly, after reflection, Dr. Davis thought that such a high standard would have "a
draconian effect" on women applicants, so he concluded that the 42.5 mL/kg/
min standard was more fitting for SEPTA's goals. Id.
74. See id. at 482 (explaining that SEPTA adopted its expert's judgments).
75. See id. (illustrating how SEPTA screened applicants).
76. See id. at 483 (noting pass rates for women and men in 1993 and 1996,
which show discriminatory effect of SEPTA's pre-employment test on women).
77. See id. at 484 (stating origins of lawsuit). The five plaintiffs brought the
suit on behalf of all the 1993 female applicants, 1996 female applicants and future
female applicants for employment as SEPTA police officers who have been denied
or will be denied employment because they cannot run one and one-half miles in
twelve minutes or less. See id. (stating facts). Furthermore, the Department of
Justice, uinder the Clinton Administration, also filed suit on behalf of the United
States challenging SEPTA's test. See id. (naming parties to case). But see James C.
Sharf, Lanning Revisited: The Third Circuit Again Rejects Relative Merit, Jan. 3, 2003, at
http://www.siop.org/tip/Jan03/05sharf.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2003) (reporting
that one of Bush Administration's early moves was to withdraw government's par-
ticipation in Lanning 1). By the time of Lanning 11, the government had withdrawn
its lawsuit against SEPTA. See id. (explaining government's actions in case); see also
Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit Decides SEPI'A Fitness Legal for Applicants, McKee Dis-
sents, 227 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 1 (2002) (reporting how Justice Department had
internal battles because many lawyers wanted to keep case). Assistant Attorney
General Ralph F. Boyd, Jr. decided to withdraw from the case, stating: "[w]e feel it
is critical to public safety that police and firefighters be able to run, climb up and
down stairs to rescue people quickly under the most trying of circumstances." Id.
78. Cf Lanning, 181 F.3d at 484 (explaining how SEPTA attempted to show
at trial that statistically significant correlation exists between high aerobic capacity
and arrests, arrest rates and commendations).
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test-which measured aerobic capacity-had a "manifest relationship" to
the critical duties of a SEPTA transit police officer.79
In Lanning I, however, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the
case, holding that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard to
measure whether SEPTA proved business necessity under the 1991 Civil
Rights Act.8 0 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the standard most
consistent with the Act and Supreme Court precedent prior to Wards
Cove-as directed by Congress's interpretative memorandum-was that
the employer must demonstrate that its pre-employment test and respec-
tive cut-off score measure only "the minimum qualifications necessary for
successful performance of the job in question." 8 Furthermore, the court
held that the standard takes public safety into consideration, for if a court
finds that failing to meet an employer's cut-off score would jeopardize
public safety, it would be indicative that the level was minimal for success-
ful job performance.8 '2
On remand, the district court held a five-day hearing and made addi-
tional findings of fact to its previous 162-page opinion from Lanning I, and
it ultimately concluded that SEPTA had proven that its 42.5 mL/kg/min
aerobic capacity test measures the minimum qualifications necessary for
the successful performance of a transit police officer.83 In Lanning II,
which involved a different panel of judges from Lanning I, the Third Cir-
cuit affirmed the judgment for the defendants. 8 4 In doing so, the Third
Circuit found that SEPTA had satisfied the "minimum qualifications" stan-
79. See id. at 484 (noting how district court found that SEPTA demonstrated
manifest relationship existed between aerobic capacity and critical duties of
SEPTA transit police officer).
80. See id. at 494 (remanding case to district court to apply correct legal stan-
dard of minimum qualifications to determine if defendant had proven business
necessity).
81. Id. at 490 (citation omitted).
82. See id. at 490 n.16 (noting that public safety can be basis for determining if
test measures minimum qualifications); see also Lanning v. Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth. (Lanning II), 308 F.3d 286, 289 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing how busi-
ness necessity standard takes public safety into consideration). If employers can
show that the inability of an applicant to meet the employer's pre-employment test
would jeopardize public safety, the Third Circuit will consider it "relevant to deter-
mine if that level is necessary for the successful performance of the job." Lanning
I, 181 F.3d at 490 n.16. Moreover, it will consider it relevant because an employee
who poses a substantial risk to public safety could not be considered to be effec-
tively performing that job's functions. See id. (explaining Third Circuit's emphasis
on public safety when analyzing employer's burden in disparate impact case).
83. See Lanning II, 308 F.3d at 289 (discussing district court's findings upon
remand). The district court found that any lesser standard than SEPTA's current
test and cut-off score "would result in officers ... who were a danger to themselves,
other officers, and the public at large, [and] unable to effectively fight and deter
crime." Id. (citation omitted); see Michael R. Triplett, Third Circuit Finds No Dispa-
rate Impact in Transit Authority Fitness Requirements, Oct. 18, 2002, at http://em-
lawcenter.bna.com/PIC/empic.nsf/ (Index) /E720C4CF45F236DE85256C56005C5
(reporting on holding in Lanning I).
84. See Lanning II, 308 F.3d at 289-93 (giving disposition of case).
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dard by proving that applicants who failed the test would be "much less
likely" to effectively execute the job's critical tasks.8 5
B. Legal Reasoning for Adopting a Strict Business Necessity Standard
Once again, the Third Circuit announced an entirely new standard
among the circuits to measure if the defendant had proven business neces-
sity under the Act.8 6 To establish the most effective standard, the court
reasoned that because the Act instructed courts to interpret its business
necessity language in conformity with Griggs and pre-Wards Cove cases, it
first had to ascertain the Court's "mission" in those cases. 87 Thus, the
Third Circuit determined that the Court's central theme in Griggs-and
later in Albemarle and Dothard-was to eliminate unnecessary barriers to em-
ployment when a neutral practice had a discriminatory impact.88 The
Third Circuit also acknowledged both that the Supreme Court adopted
strict standards in those cases to effectuate that mission and that the Act
attempted to reinstate a more pro-plaintiff interpretation of Title VII,
given that Congress enacted it as an immediate response to Wards Cove's
pro-employer standard.8 9 The court concluded, therefore, that the strict
"minimum qualifications" standard would most effectively encompass
those considerations and eliminate an employer's use of excessive, and so
unnecessary, requirements that have a disparate impact on protected
groups and that operate as a barrier to employment opportunities 10
C. Positive Aspects of the Third Circuit's Standard
At the very least, the "minimum qualifications" standard meets the
Act's objectives.9 ' First, by requiring the employer to test only for mini-
mum qualifications, the standard ensures that applicants in Title VII's pro-
tected classes are given a fair opportunity to obtain meaningful
employment by not being unnecessarily excluded through arbitrary tests
85. Id. at 291. But see MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 443-44 (5th ed. 2000) (suggesting that SEPTA's test
may be job-related in sense that everyone who passes it will be fit for job, yet test
may not be job-related in sense that those who fail test are not fit to be police
officers).
86. Cf Hollar, supra note 23, at 791-93 (listing Third Circuit's minimum quali-
fications standard to prove business necessity as strictest standard to date).
87. See Lanning 1, 181 F.3d at 489 (concluding that only minimum qualifica-
tions standard is consistent with Court's holding in Griggs).
88. See id. (articulating Supreme Court precedent by stating that it requires
that employers' applicant screening tests have cut-off levels that reflect only qualifi-
cations necessary to successful job performance).
89. Cf id. at 487-88 (discussing how Act's intended standard of measuring
business necessity should be close to one enunciated in Griggs).
90. See id. at 490 (concluding that minimum qualifications standard is most
consistent with Act's intent).
91. See Hollar, supra note 23, at 787 (noting how Act attempted to conform to
strict standards enunciated in Griggs and its progeny and to reinstate more pro-
plaintiff standard).
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and cut-off scores. 9 2 In effect, the standard combats an employer who may
covertly discriminate with a facially neutral practice. 93 Second, the stan-
dard comports with the Act's language mandating that the challenged
practice be "consistent with business necessity" and 'job related. '94
Hence, an employer who uses a test that measures the bare "minimum"
qualifications means that the qualifications are a necessity, and so, they
must be "consistent with business necessity";95 similarly, a test that mea-
sures the minimum skills necessary for "successful job performance"-as
the Third Circuit's approach requires-by implication means that the
skills must be 'job related," otherwise they would not lead to successful job
performance. 96 Lastly, the Third Circuit's standard is a strict legal stan-
dard, a standard undoubtedly closer to the pro-employee Griggs decision
than the pro-employer Wards Cove decision, which was Congress's appar-
ent intent.97 In sum, the standard-unlike the other circuits' more leni-
92. See Grossman, supra note 60, at 3-4 (discussing how Lanning I designed
strict legal standard to eliminate discriminatory hiring practices). Grossman fur-
ther notes her distress over the fact that Lanning II was a retreat from the strict
standard established in Lanning I. See id. (stating author's disapproval with Lan-
ning Ifs ruling). Thus, she argues that Lanning II misapplied the strict legal stan-
dard and effectively diminished its harshness and ability to eliminate
discriminatory screening tests. See id. (explaining author's disapproval).
93. See Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 489-90 (explaining effectiveness of Third Cir-
cuit's minimum qualifications standard in measuring business necessity). The
court explained that:
The disparate impact theory of discrimination combats not intentional,
obvious discriminatory policies, but a type of covert discrimination in
which facially neutral practices are employed to exclude, unnecessarily
and disparately, protected groups from employment opportunities. In-
herent in the adoption of this theory of discrimination is the recognition
that an employer's job requirements may incorporate societal standards
based not upon necessity but rather upon historical, discriminatory bi-
ases. A business necessity standard that wholly defers to an employer's
judgment as to what is desirable in an employee therefore is completely
inadequate in combating covert discrimination based upon societal
prejudices. Only a business necessity doctrine that examines discrimina-
tory cut-off scores in light of the minimum qualifications that are neces-
sary to perform the job in question successfully can address adequately
this subtle form of discrimination.
Id.
94. See id. at 489 (noting that business necessity language in Act and EEOC
guidelines support Third Circuit's standard); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(H) (2003)
(stating that cut-off scores should be established "so as to be reasonable and consis-
tent with normal expectations of acceptable proficiency within the work force").
95. See Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 489 (commenting on fact that if standard only
required qualities measured by pre-employment tests to bear merely some relation-
ship to job, it would make "business necessity" prong of Act's language virtually
meaningless).
96. Cf id. at 489-90 (detailing how standard embodies "job-related" prong of
Act).
97. See id. at 489 (stating how minimum qualifications standard encompasses
central themes of Griggs and its pre-Wards Cove progeny). For a more complete
discussion of Criggs, Wards Cove and the relevant cases decided between the two,
see supra notes 24-39 and accompanying text. The interpretative memorandum,
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ent standards-does not give employers wide discretion to create
irrational, discriminatory tests because it forces courts to closely scrutinize
the employer's basis for enacting its job-selection criteria.9 8
D. Conceptual Problems with the Third Circuit's Approach
Several problems exist with the Third Circuit's "minimum qualifica-
tions" standard. 99 First, it arguably requires more than the Act man-
dates. 110  Specifically, the standard-by requiring the test to solely
measure the absolute business necessities for effective job performance, or
simply the bare minimum-disregards the Act's language that it only has
to be "consistent" with business necessity."" In turn, such an unjustified,
harsh standard may lead employers to enact quotas, which are prohibited
and seemingly contrary to the Act's intent, to avoid litigation and scrutiny
under this harsh standard; 1° 2 or, alternatively, the "minimum qualifica-
tions" standard may force employers to constantly measure the statistical
impact of each of their practices and conduct a utility analysis on any prac-
tice with a discriminatory impact, which could be expensive and prohibi-
which Congress mandated that courts consider as the sole source of legislative his-
tory, states in pertinent part: "The terms 'business necessity' and 'job-related' are
intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in [Griggs], and
in other Supreme Court decisions prior to [Wards Cove]." 137 CONG. REC. 28,680
(1991) (providing interpretative memorandum to 1991 Civil Rights Act).
98. See Lanning I, 181 F.3d at 493 n.21 (encouraging district court on remand
to take closer, critical look at employer's studies and evidence).
99. See generally id. at 502 (Weis, J., dissenting) (explaining difficulties
presented by minimum qualifications standard).
100. See Rosemary Alito, Disparate Inpact Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 1011, 1032-33 (1993) (concluding that Act's lan-
guage does not require employer to prove test is absolute necessity); see also Hollar,
supra note 23, at 798 (arguing that minimum qualifications standard does not coin-
cide with Act).
101. SeeAlito, supra note 100, at 1031-33 ("Congress did not require that the
practice be compelled by business necessity."). Alito further argued that if Con-
gress wanted to adopt an absolute necessity standard or a minimum qualifications
standard, it would have used specific language that revealed such an intent. See id.
(articulating author's arguments). Therefore, she continued, the fact that Con-
gress did not do so shows that it did not intend to adopt such a strict standard. See
id. (stating author's conclusion); Hollar, supra note 23, at 798 (stating that Third
Circuit's standard writes out word "consistent" from statute because standard re-
quires proof of business necessity, whereas statute only requires consistency with
business necessity).
102. See Alito, supra note 100, at 1013 (noting how Act "in no way" requires
employers to use quotas or make employment decisions based on statutorily pro-
tected characteristics). Alito discussed an employer's dilemma:
While employers are statutorily barred from hiring anyone on the basis of
[protected characteristics], these same employers are told in litigation
that unless they can explain why their employees do not fit the desired
statistical grid, their "unbalanced" workforce may be evidence of their
intent to discriminate and proof of illegal disparate impact
discrimination.
Id. at 1012.
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tive. 103 Hence, given the standard's potential impact on employers, legal
commentators question whether the Third Circuit's interpretation ade-
quately achieves the Act's goal of preserving an employer's legitimate
discretion. 104
Another practical problem with the Third Circuit's standard is how to
determine the "minimum qualifications" for a given job.1° 5 One commen-
tator illustrated the complexity of the matter:
If you were selecting a team to climb Mt. Everest with you, would
you require all applicants to have two legs? Would you require
them all to have reasonably good vision? Sure you would ....
But, a one-legged guy has climbed Everest; so has a blind guy. So,
what are the minimum requirements to climb that mountain? 0 6
In other words, it may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for employ-
ers to identify only the essential skills for a job, create a test limited to
measuring those skills and successfully defend it in a disparate impact case
in the Third Circuit.
1o7
E. Responding to Criticism: A Strict Rule with Application Softness?
Litigants should be aware that although the "minimum qualifications"
standard is a strict standard in theory, the Third Circuit perhaps indicated
in Lanning I-which is the first and only case to which it applied the stan-
dard-that the "minimum qualifications" standard may not be as strict in
practice. 10 8 Lanning II revealed several important considerations for liti-
gants about an employer's practical burdens when proving business neces-
sity in a Third Circuit disparate impact suit.10 9
103. See id. at 1032-33 (discussing conceptual problems with requiring em-
ployer to prove absolute necessity of its employment practice, which Act does not
require).
104. See Spiropoulos, supra note 15, at 1528 ("Courts must interpret Title VII
in a manner that will both facilitate the removal of arbitrary barriers to equal em-
ployment opportunities and protect legitimate employer prerogatives.").
105. See Sharf, supra note 77, at 6-10 (reporting employment lawyers' con-
cerns with minimum qualifications standard).
106. Id. (quoting employment lawyer, David Copus).
107. See id. (explaining problem with Third Circuit's minimum qualifications
standard). David Copus comments that "[i]t does not make sense to say that any
given set of qualifications is the minimum necessary to do a job. All we can ever
say is that we are not going to take a chance on anyone below that level of qualifi-
cations." Id.
108. See Grossman, supra note 60, at 4-6 (arguing that Third Circuit did not
correctly implement its own standard); Sharf, supra note 77, 6-10 (reporting com-
ments by employment lawyers that Lanning Iwas subtle shift away from Lanning rs
principles).
109. See Sharf, supra note 77, at 7-9 (disclosing comments from RobertJ. Ma-
lionek, employment lawyer, about Lanning I). Malionek notes that Lanning II
made clear that the "'minimum qualifications' standard is not meant to demand a
perfect cut-off score which separates out all those who can perform the job from all
those who cannot." Id.
2003] CASEBRIEF 1425
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First, the Third Circuit gives significant weight to an employer's justifi-
cation for its discriminatory practice, especially if it is to increase public
safety.1 1 Initially, the court in Lanning I suggested that lower courts
should not readily accept an employer's justification for using a discrimi-
natory practice at face value.' 1 In LanningII, however, the court not only
loosely accepted SEPTA's public safety justification for its test, but also
virtually relied on it as a basis for its entire opinion.' 1 2
Second, the court liberally defines the term "minimum qualifica-
tions."' 1 3 Thus, an employer apparently does not have to accept all appli-
cants that have some minute chance of successfully performing the job.1 14
For instance, to prove that the test did not validly measure only the mini-
mum qualifications, the plaintiffs in Lanning I showed that one applicant
who had failed SEPTA's fitness test, yet was hired due to a clerical error,
eventually became a highly decorated officer. 15 Notwithstanding such ev-
idence, the court held that a test could still be justified even if it excluded
candidates that had some chance ofjob success; 116 the court required only
that the test differentiate between those who are "likely to be able to do
110. See id. (discussing deference Third Circuit gave to SEPTA in Lanning I).
111. See id. (interpreting Lanning I and its implications).
112. See id. (noting change in Third Circuit's apparent direction from Lan-
ning Ito Lanning Hwith respect to more readily accepting defendant's justification
for using test that has disparate impact on protected Title VII class); see also Lan-
ning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning II), 308 F.3d 286, 289, 292 (3d
Cir. 2002) (listing employer's stated reason for using test and how it serves as un-
derlying justification for court's holding). SEPTA stated that its goal was to up-
grade the quality of its workforce and increase public safety. See id. at 289 (giving
employer's reason for eventually implementing its pre-employment test). The
court, after recognizing those goals, prefaced its opinion by stating that "[i]t is
against this backdrop that we assess the sole issue we caused to be resolved on
remand." Id. Later, it stated that even the "dissent [in Lanning II] concedes that
SEPTA has the right to improve its workforce." Id. at 292.
113. See Grossman, supra note 60, at 4-5 (arguing that Third Circuit upheld
SEPTA's pre-employment, physical fitness exam and it was "no minimum
qualification").
114. See Lanning II, 308 F.3d at 292 (articulating that employer can reasonably
demand that its applicants' chance of success be greater than twenty percent,
showing that it can disqualify applicants who have some chance of success).
115. SeeLanningv. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning I), 181 F.3d 478,
483-84 (3d Cir. 1999) (providing facts of case and noting how one officer who had
failed, yet had been mistakenly hired, has been nominated repeatedly for awards,
such as "Officer of the Year" and "Officer of the Quarter"). The Third Circuit
found irrelevant the fact that some incumbent officers had also failed the physical
fitness exam, yet still successfully performed the job and its functions well. See id.
at 494 n.24 (agreeing with lower court). It should be noted that SEPTA initially
disciplined those incumbent officers who had failed the test. See id. at 483 (discuss-
ing employer's initial actions). Due to protests from the employees' union, how-
ever, SEPTA refrained from disciplinary action and, alternatively, implemented an
incentive program for those officers passing its fitness goals. See id. (stating
SEPTA's reaction to union's demands).
116. See Lanning II, 308 F.3d at 292 ("It is perfectly reasonable, however, [for
an employer] to demand a chance of success that is better than 5% to 20%.").
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the job" and those who are not.' 7 Accordingly, it upheld SEPTA's test,
which indicated that those who passed the test had an on-the-job success
rate of seventy to ninety percent compared to only a five to twenty percent
success rate for those who failed the test.
1 18
Finally, the Third Circuit does not require employers to meet a high
evidentiary standard to support a business necessity defense." 19 After the
Lanning I court directed the district court to take a close, "critical look" at
the employer's validation studies, the court in Lanning Hwas satisfied with
SEPTA providing merely "competent evidence" that its test meets the
"minimum qualifications" standard.120
In sum, Lanning II clarified the Third Circuit's business necessity stan-
dard that had been set forth in Lanning 1.121 Lanning II, in effect, showed
practitioners that an employer's burden of proving business necessity was
not unreasonable and could feasibly be met with less precision and diffi-
culty than previously expected.
122
F. The Third Circuit Should Consider Adopting a Less Stringent Standard
Because the Third Circuit appeared to leniently apply a strict theoreti-
cal standard-which may even require more than the Act intended-the
court should consider adopting a less stringent, equally permissible stan-
dard for measuring a business necessity defense so that the Third Circuit's
law is both theoretically and practically consistent. 12 3 For instance, as dis-
cussed in Part II, many circuits use the more lenient "manifest relation-
ship" standard, which requires the employer to show a "manifest
relationship" between its pre-employment requirements and successful job
117. Id. at 291.
118. See id. (showing what classifies as permissible test under minimum quali-
fications standard).
119. See Sharf, supra note 77, at 7 (reporting comments from employment
lawyer on how minimum qualifications standard is not "one of absolutes" as evi-
denced by Lanning I's holdings).
120. See id. (stating court's decision in Lanning I); see also Lanning II, 308 F.3d
at 288 (holding that SEPTA adequately provided evidence to prove test was busi-
ness necessity).
121. See Sharf, supra note 77, at 7-9 (providing comments from employment
lawyer, RobertJ. Malionek). Malionek stated that "it is the clarification and appli-
cation of [the Lanning !standard] to the facts in Lanning H that can be recognized
as bringing about a subtle shift away from what could have been a draconian stan-
dard in practice." Id.
122. See id. (reporting comments from employment lawyer Keith Pyburn).
123. See Grossman, supra note 60, at 4-5 (discussing how Lanning II court mis-
applied minimum qualifications standard and negated Congress's intent). Gross-
man concluded after Lanning 11 that "[SEPTA's fitness test] is not really a
minimum qualification for the job," which means the Third Circuit misapplied its
own standard. Id.; see also Sharf, supra note 77, at 9-10 (noting how Third Circuit
did not strictly apply its standard). Keith Pyburn states that the court in Lanningll,
"while reiterating the language of the original holding, proceed[ed] to allow a
'reasonable' cut score [sic] based on the factual record of this case." Id.
25
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performance to prove business necessity. 12 4 If the Third Circuit used the
"manifest relationship" standard in Lanning II, it would have produced the
same result as the "minimum qualifications" standard. 125 Accordingly, if
the Third Circuit adopts the "manifest relationship" standard or a similar
standard to evaluate a business necessity defense, litigants practicing in the
Third Circuit will be able to confidently rely on Lanning H with respect to
what the court expects an employer to show in order to meet its bur-
den. 12 6 Otherwise, litigants can only cautiously rely on Lanning II, while
also having to be prepared to meet the strictness of Lanning f's evidentiary
requirements. 12
7
V. CONCLUSION
In all, if employers create ajob-selection test, they should be prepared
to meet a variety of legal issues if a disparate impact results, for even the
most well-documented justifications may not suffice in the Third Cir-
cuit. 128 Practitioners must realize that although SEPTA prevailed in Lan-
ning II, the Third Circuit has employed the strictest approach among the
circuits in measuring the business necessity defense.1 29 Furthermore,
even if a defendant proves business necessity under the Act, the plaintiff
can still prevail by showing a less discriminatory alternative that meets the
employer's needs. 13°) Therefore, litigants for employers in a disparate im-
pact case must be able to satisfy the "minimum qualifications" standard to
justify their clients' employment practices and, in the process, should re-
124. SeeAss'n of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 585
(9th Cir. 2000) (using manifest relationship test to evaluate employer's business
necessity defense in disparate impact claim). For a further discussion of the mani-
fest relationship test, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
125. Cf Sharf, supra note 77, at 9-10 (reporting comments by Keith Pyburn
that Third Circuit used almost "reasonableness" standard to adjudicate Lanning
I/).
126. For a further discussion of what an employer must show to successfully
prove business necessity under Lanning II, see supra notes 105-20 and accompany-
ing text.
127. For a further discussion of how Lanning II unexpectedly applied Lanning
/'s principles, see supra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
128. See Brooks, supra note 20, at 11-12 (cautioning practitioners about diffi-
culty they may encounter in proving business necessity in Third Circtuit); see also
Fitness Counts for Police Officers, 13 PA. EMP. L. LE'IER (Dec. 2002) ("[Employers]
should always be careful in implementing any test.., since such testing has inher-
ent legal risks that need to be evaluated."). Employers who establish a job-selec-
tion test should determine its impact on protected classes, and if a disparate
impact exists, they should implement it only if a business necessity for the test
exists. See id. (giving advice to employers).
129. See Hollar, supra note 23, at 791 (describing high burden of minimum
qualifications standard).
130. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (Lanning 1), 181 F.3d 478,
485 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975)) (discussing burdens of proof in disparate impact cases); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (ii) (2003) (stating burdens of proof in Title VII cases).
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but the counterargument that a less discriminatory alternative exists. 13'
They should, however, encourage the Third Circuit to adopt a standard
that is more deferential to employers.1 32 Plaintiffs, on the other hand,
should argue to keep the current standard, but strive for a more literal
application of it.
1 33
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit has thus far failed to reliably articulate
its expectations for an employer to justify an employment practice with a
disparate impact through a business necessity defense. 134 In turn, current
Third Circuit law allows a panel for a given set of facts-perhaps depend-
ing upon the particular whims of the judges-to harshly or leniently scruti-
nize an employer's business necessity defense in a disparate impact
case. 135 Thus, until the Supreme Court clarifies the issue, or until the
Third Circuit either adopts a more lenient standard or applies its current
standard more literally, litigants must be prepared for both possibilities. 13 6
Michael R. Sarno
131. Cf Lanning, 181 F.3d at 485 (conveying what defendants need to show
in Title VII disparate impact cases to prevail).
132. See Lanning 1, 181 F.3d at 504 (Weis, J., dissenting) (arguing that Third
Circuit should have used standard that gives more deference to employers).
133. See Grossman, supra note 60, at 4-6 (arguing that Third Circuit in Lan-
ning II should have been harsher in its application of minimum qualifications
standard).
134. See Sharf, supra note 77, at 9-10 (reporting comments by Keith Pyburn,
employment lawyer). Pyburn notes that the majority in Lanning II only reiterated
the language of the minimum qualifications standard, though it actually used a
"reasonableness" standard to evaluate SEPTA's business necessity defense. See id.
(discussing Third Circuit's analysis).
135. See Grossman, supra note 60, at 4 ("Although the panel paid lip service
(as it had to) to the earlier panel's articulation of the legal standard, it did little to
see that the standard has been implemented correctly by the lower court."); Sharf,
supra note 77, at 7 (arguing that Lanning Hwas "subtle shift away" from Lanning 's
"draconian" standard).
136. See Sharf, supra note 77, at 9-10 (reporting comments by Keith Pyburn).
Pyburn acknowledges that Lanning II continued-rather than clarified-the de-
bate over the correct standard in the Third Circuit for measuring an employer's
business necessity defense under the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See id. (discussing Lan-
ning Ifs implications).
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